Blab Tech
China Suspends Gallium Export Ban to the United States Until November 2026
When China’s Ministry of Commerce announced on 3 December 2024 that it would bar the export of gallium, germanium and antimony to the United States, the move sent ripples through the high‑tech supply chain. The decree also forbade the sale of these materials to U.S. military users or for any military purpose, a direct response to Washington’s own tightening of controls on advanced chips and chip‑making equipment that had pushed more than a hundred Chinese firms onto a restricted‑trade list.
Gallium is a soft, silvery metal that comes almost entirely as a by‑product of refining aluminium from bauxite and, to a lesser extent, zinc. China is the sole producer of primary low‑purity gallium, while the United States stopped domestic production decades ago when Chinese output became cheaper. In 2024, the United States Geological Survey reported that China supplied roughly 99 % of the world’s primary gallium, with global production around 760 t and China’s share about 750 t.
The metal’s value lies in its role in gallium arsenide (GaAs) and gallium nitride (GaN). GaAs powers high‑frequency, high‑power stages in mobile handsets, radar, radio links and satellite payloads. GaN is critical for advanced radar arrays, electronic‑warfare systems, missile seekers, satellite solar cells, 5G base stations and power electronics. Because gallium is a small‑volume, high‑consequence material, China’s near‑total monopoly gives it leverage over a supply chain that has few alternative sources.
China’s licensing controls, already in place since August 2023, had pushed direct gallium shipments to the United States nearly to zero before the December 2024 ban. U.S. trade data show that some restricted material still reaches the United States indirectly, routed through third countries. The Stimson Center found that this loophole blunts the practical effect of a direct ban while maintaining a strategic signal.
The U.S. government estimated that a complete Chinese ban on gallium and germanium could reduce U.S. economic output by about $3.4 billion and raise gallium prices by more than 150 %. The clause that prohibits supplying U.S. military users is the most directly relevant to defense electronics.
After a meeting between former U.S. President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping in late 2025, China’s Ministry of Commerce suspended the U.S. prohibition for one year, until 27 November 2026, according to Reuters. Gallium, germanium and antimony remain under export controls that require licences, and the prohibition on supplying U.S. military users was not revoked.
The underlying dependence on Chinese supply has not changed significantly. Primary gallium is recovered as a by‑product of aluminium and zinc refining, not from a dedicated mine. Building alternative production capacity outside China requires capital and time that the pre‑2023 price did not justify.
Eurasian Resources Group announced a $20 million investment to recover gallium from its alumina operations in Kazakhstan. Production is planned to begin in the third quarter of 2026, with an annual output of up to 15 t under a long‑term supply deal with Mitsubishi Corporation. If the project reaches production, Kazakhstan would become the second‑largest producer after China. However, 15 t is a small fraction of the 750 t supplied by China.
The situation remains a pause rather than a resolution. Licences can be granted slowly or quickly, and the suspension has an expiry date. Until alternative supply is real, the licensing regime in Beijing determines how much gallium reaches U.S. factories, whether the ban is in force or not.
The U.S. government has taken steps to reduce reliance on Chinese gallium. In September 2025, the Department of Energy announced up to $6 million in funding for research and development projects to establish a secure domestic gallium supply chain. The Pentagon’s 2026 gallium strategy also targets production independence.
In summary, China’s December 2024 ban on gallium, germanium and antimony exports to the United States was lifted in a one‑year suspension that ends on 27 November 2026. The ban had limited practical effect because of indirect supply routes. China’s dominance of gallium production remains, but new projects outside China are underway, though they are unlikely to replace China’s supply in the near term. The licensing regime in China will continue to shape the flow of gallium to U.S. customers until the suspension expires.
Gallium is a soft, silvery metal that comes almost entirely as a by‑product of refining aluminium from bauxite and, to a lesser extent, zinc. China is the sole producer of primary low‑purity gallium, while the United States stopped domestic production decades ago when Chinese output became cheaper. In 2024, the United States Geological Survey reported that China supplied roughly 99 % of the world’s primary gallium, with global production around 760 t and China’s share about 750 t.
The metal’s value lies in its role in gallium arsenide (GaAs) and gallium nitride (GaN). GaAs powers high‑frequency, high‑power stages in mobile handsets, radar, radio links and satellite payloads. GaN is critical for advanced radar arrays, electronic‑warfare systems, missile seekers, satellite solar cells, 5G base stations and power electronics. Because gallium is a small‑volume, high‑consequence material, China’s near‑total monopoly gives it leverage over a supply chain that has few alternative sources.
China’s licensing controls, already in place since August 2023, had pushed direct gallium shipments to the United States nearly to zero before the December 2024 ban. U.S. trade data show that some restricted material still reaches the United States indirectly, routed through third countries. The Stimson Center found that this loophole blunts the practical effect of a direct ban while maintaining a strategic signal.
The U.S. government estimated that a complete Chinese ban on gallium and germanium could reduce U.S. economic output by about $3.4 billion and raise gallium prices by more than 150 %. The clause that prohibits supplying U.S. military users is the most directly relevant to defense electronics.
After a meeting between former U.S. President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping in late 2025, China’s Ministry of Commerce suspended the U.S. prohibition for one year, until 27 November 2026, according to Reuters. Gallium, germanium and antimony remain under export controls that require licences, and the prohibition on supplying U.S. military users was not revoked.
The underlying dependence on Chinese supply has not changed significantly. Primary gallium is recovered as a by‑product of aluminium and zinc refining, not from a dedicated mine. Building alternative production capacity outside China requires capital and time that the pre‑2023 price did not justify.
Eurasian Resources Group announced a $20 million investment to recover gallium from its alumina operations in Kazakhstan. Production is planned to begin in the third quarter of 2026, with an annual output of up to 15 t under a long‑term supply deal with Mitsubishi Corporation. If the project reaches production, Kazakhstan would become the second‑largest producer after China. However, 15 t is a small fraction of the 750 t supplied by China.
The situation remains a pause rather than a resolution. Licences can be granted slowly or quickly, and the suspension has an expiry date. Until alternative supply is real, the licensing regime in Beijing determines how much gallium reaches U.S. factories, whether the ban is in force or not.
The U.S. government has taken steps to reduce reliance on Chinese gallium. In September 2025, the Department of Energy announced up to $6 million in funding for research and development projects to establish a secure domestic gallium supply chain. The Pentagon’s 2026 gallium strategy also targets production independence.
In summary, China’s December 2024 ban on gallium, germanium and antimony exports to the United States was lifted in a one‑year suspension that ends on 27 November 2026. The ban had limited practical effect because of indirect supply routes. China’s dominance of gallium production remains, but new projects outside China are underway, though they are unlikely to replace China’s supply in the near term. The licensing regime in China will continue to shape the flow of gallium to U.S. customers until the suspension expires.
