Blab Tech
LG Electronics to Suspend Smart-TV Apps Using Residential Proxy SDKs
LG Electronics has announced that it will suspend any webOS smart‑TV applications that embed residential proxy software development kits (SDKs). The decision follows a study by security firm Spur Intelligence, which found that more than 42 % of LG webOS apps and 26.5 % of Samsung Tizen apps contain such SDKs.
Spur’s analysis examined 6,038 apps distributed through LG’s webOS and Samsung’s Tizen platforms. It identified 2,058 apps—about 34 % of the sample—that included residential proxy SDKs from vendors such as Bright Data, Massive, and Honeygain/Oxylabs. The research also showed that some SDKs remain active after the associated TV app is closed, allowing proxy traffic to continue in the background.
Residential proxies reroute third‑party internet traffic through a consumer’s home connection, making the traffic appear to originate from the household’s public IP address. While the technology can be used for legitimate purposes such as web data collection or advertising verification, it can also be abused to conceal malicious activity. Recent takedowns of large residential proxy networks have highlighted the risk of using compromised consumer devices as proxy nodes.
LG’s Senior Vice President John Taylor said the company is working with developers to remove the proxy option from webOS applications. Although no specific deadline has been announced, apps that retain the functionality will be suspended. The company also indicated that its upcoming review process may require developers to disclose background network activity and obtain user consent for services that continue after an app is closed.
The study noted that some proxy SDKs enforce restrictions on private and reserved IP ranges. For example, Bright Data’s SDK includes such limits, whereas the local versions of Massive and Honeygain/Oxylabs did not implement comparable protections. This lack of filtering could allow proxy traffic to reach private network addresses or bypass filtering mechanisms, potentially providing a path to other devices on the home network.
Other platform operators have taken similar steps. Amazon explicitly prohibits the use of proxy services for third parties, and Roku has reported restricting similar software. Samsung announced on 4 August 2026 that it would ban smart‑TV apps containing residential proxy software from its Tizen platform, following research by Mnemonic that found proxy SDKs in 26.9 % of its apps.
The vendors themselves have described their SDKs as responsible and ethical. Bright Data states that its SDK includes an opt‑in screen that discloses proxy participation. Massive claims to employ KYC checks, server‑side controls, and consent checks. Oxylabs reports implementing filtering and local‑network restrictions through both infrastructure and SDK‑level controls.
LG’s decision underscores the need for clearer disclosures and stronger app‑review policies. The company’s plan to suspend non‑compliant apps signals a shift toward tighter scrutiny of background network activity on smart‑TV platforms. The move also reflects broader industry concerns about consumer devices being leveraged as covert proxy nodes.
As of now, LG has not released a timetable for when developers must remove proxy functionality. The company’s next steps will likely involve a formal review of all webOS apps, with a focus on identifying and removing residential proxy SDKs. Users who have installed apps that may still contain proxy capabilities should monitor their TV’s network activity and consider uninstalling any applications that do not provide clear consent mechanisms.
The regulatory landscape remains unchanged, but the industry’s response to the Spur study may influence future guidelines on third‑party network usage in consumer electronics. LG’s action is a significant development in the ongoing effort to protect home networks from covert exploitation.
Spur’s analysis examined 6,038 apps distributed through LG’s webOS and Samsung’s Tizen platforms. It identified 2,058 apps—about 34 % of the sample—that included residential proxy SDKs from vendors such as Bright Data, Massive, and Honeygain/Oxylabs. The research also showed that some SDKs remain active after the associated TV app is closed, allowing proxy traffic to continue in the background.
Residential proxies reroute third‑party internet traffic through a consumer’s home connection, making the traffic appear to originate from the household’s public IP address. While the technology can be used for legitimate purposes such as web data collection or advertising verification, it can also be abused to conceal malicious activity. Recent takedowns of large residential proxy networks have highlighted the risk of using compromised consumer devices as proxy nodes.
LG’s Senior Vice President John Taylor said the company is working with developers to remove the proxy option from webOS applications. Although no specific deadline has been announced, apps that retain the functionality will be suspended. The company also indicated that its upcoming review process may require developers to disclose background network activity and obtain user consent for services that continue after an app is closed.
The study noted that some proxy SDKs enforce restrictions on private and reserved IP ranges. For example, Bright Data’s SDK includes such limits, whereas the local versions of Massive and Honeygain/Oxylabs did not implement comparable protections. This lack of filtering could allow proxy traffic to reach private network addresses or bypass filtering mechanisms, potentially providing a path to other devices on the home network.
Other platform operators have taken similar steps. Amazon explicitly prohibits the use of proxy services for third parties, and Roku has reported restricting similar software. Samsung announced on 4 August 2026 that it would ban smart‑TV apps containing residential proxy software from its Tizen platform, following research by Mnemonic that found proxy SDKs in 26.9 % of its apps.
The vendors themselves have described their SDKs as responsible and ethical. Bright Data states that its SDK includes an opt‑in screen that discloses proxy participation. Massive claims to employ KYC checks, server‑side controls, and consent checks. Oxylabs reports implementing filtering and local‑network restrictions through both infrastructure and SDK‑level controls.
LG’s decision underscores the need for clearer disclosures and stronger app‑review policies. The company’s plan to suspend non‑compliant apps signals a shift toward tighter scrutiny of background network activity on smart‑TV platforms. The move also reflects broader industry concerns about consumer devices being leveraged as covert proxy nodes.
As of now, LG has not released a timetable for when developers must remove proxy functionality. The company’s next steps will likely involve a formal review of all webOS apps, with a focus on identifying and removing residential proxy SDKs. Users who have installed apps that may still contain proxy capabilities should monitor their TV’s network activity and consider uninstalling any applications that do not provide clear consent mechanisms.
The regulatory landscape remains unchanged, but the industry’s response to the Spur study may influence future guidelines on third‑party network usage in consumer electronics. LG’s action is a significant development in the ongoing effort to protect home networks from covert exploitation.
